

The description of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and its intentional meaning: Kamalaśīla's solution for the doctrinal conflict between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra

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1. Introduction

At the beginning of the first chapter of the *uttarapakṣa* of the *Madhyamakāloka* (hereafter MĀ), Kamalaśīla says that he follows Dharmakīrti's position on scriptural authority. As his way of determining the reliability or authority of scriptures, Kamalaśīla adopts the threefold investigation explained in the Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (hereafter PV) I k. 215 and called “threefold analysis” (*dpyad pa gsum / dpyad gsum*) in the Tibetan Buddhism.¹ It is said in the MĀ:

[Therefore,] since statements ascertained as faultless by means of three kinds of investigations (*tshul gsum gyi brtag pas*) and as excellent for the first [stage of practice, i.e., hearing (*śruti*)], the last [stage, i.e., meditation (*bhāvanā*)], and the middle [stage, i.e., consideration (*cintā*)], are non-belying (*avisamvāda*), scholars should rely upon such [statements].²

Dharmakīrti's threefold investigation called *tshul gsum gyi brtag pa* by Kamalaśīla before Tibetan Buddhists called it *dpyad pa gsum* is as follows:

- (1) A scripture's or treatise's accounts of perceptible states of affairs (*aparokṣa*) are not refuted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).
- (2) Its accounts of imperceptible states of affairs (*parokṣa*) are not refuted by any inference which functions by the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*).

¹ For Kamalaśīla's adopting Dharmakīrti's position on scriptural authority and his three kinds of investigations, see KEIRA (2006).

PV I k. 215: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisamvādas tadarthayoḥ //* “A [treatise's] being non-belying [means that] there is no invalidation of its two [kinds of] propositions concerning empirical and unempirical things by direct perception or by the two sorts of inferences [viz., inference which functions by the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) and inference based upon scripture (*āgamāśrītānumāna*)].” See TILLEMANS (1999) p. 28, 3-9.

² MĀ D148b4-5: *[de'i phyir] bka' gang zhig tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yongs su dag pa thog ma dang tha ma dang bar du dge bar nges pa de ni mi slu ba'i phyir de mkhas pa mams kyis brten par bya ba nyid do //*. See MAV D83a2-3 and MAP D133b1-2.

(3) The scripture's or treatise's statements concerning radically inaccessible states of affairs (*atyantaparoḥṣa*) are not directly or indirectly contradicted by other statements in the scripture or in the treatise, i.e., by another scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*).³

According to Dharmakīrti, a scripture or treatise will be reliable or authoritative for the inference of radically inaccessible (*atyantaparoḥṣa*) objects, such as heavens (*svarga*) and hells, if it passes the above-explained threefold investigation. The selflessness (*nairātmya*) or absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of dharmas is regarded as an imperceptible (*paroḥṣa*) object which is objectively inferable, and therefore when one wants to quote a scripture's description concerning the absence of intrinsic nature, the second investigation (2) of the above-explained threefold investigation serves as the criterion for judging whether he can accept that description or not; it is required that that description is not refuted by any *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, i.e., objectively functioning inference. For Kamalaśīla, that description must not be contradicted with the absence of ultimately existing intrinsic nature which is regarded as the ultimate (*paramārtha*) or reality (*tattva*) and is established by the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* stating five reasons, such as “diamond-splinters” (*vajrakaṇa*), dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and being neither one nor many (*ekānekaviyoga*).⁴

Kamalaśīla accepts not only Dharmakīrti's idea of the two sorts of inferences, i.e., *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* and *āgamāśritānumāna*, but also his position on scriptural authority. Moreover we have already clarified elsewhere that Kamalaśīla relied upon and expanded Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) when he proves or establishes the Mādhyamika position of the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁵ Due to these facts, we can understand that Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition serves as his grounds for proving or establishing the Mādhyamika position of the absence of real intrinsic nature.⁶

Now, after stating that he follows Dharmakīrti's position on scriptural authority, Kamalaśīla, in the MĀ, undertakes the Mādhyamika interpretations of the definitive meaning (*nītārtha*), interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*), three natures (*trisvabhāva*), three kinds of no-natures (*trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā*), idea of mind only (*cittamātra*) and so forth. Offering those

³ See TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 78-79. On the investigation by *āgamāśritānumāna*, see PV IV k. 107: *virodhodbhāvanaprāyā pariḥṣāpy atra tadyathā / adharmamūlaṃ rāgādī snānaṃ cādharmaśodhanam* //. English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 150, 7-12: “In the case of this [treatise], examination, moreover, consists chiefly in pointing out contradictions [between prior and subsequent propositions and is not concerned with facts (*vāstavi*)]. For example, [contradictions such as when it is said that] desire, etc. are the root of immorality and that bathing is what purifies immorality.”

⁴ For Kamalaśīla's five reasons for proving the absence of ultimately existing intrinsic nature imagined by others, see KEIRA (2004) p. 10, fn. 32. For the logico-grammatical structure of the thesis of *niḥsvabhāvatā*, see KEIRA ibid., pp. 30-38.

⁵ KEIRA ibid. pp. 47-86 and p. 86, fn. 131.

⁶ See KEIRA (2006) pp. 184-185.

Mādhyamika interpretations, he seems to undertake to make the Yogācāra philosophy and the Mādhyamika philosophy compatible. This, however, does not mean that the former should be on an equal footing with the latter. This is just a Mādhyamika philosophical approach to the Yogācāra philosophy for the purpose of showing that the Mādhyamika philosophy is superior to the Yogācāra philosophy. This philosophical approach, however, makes it possible for Kamalaśīla to solve the doctrinal conflict between the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra and to link the Yogācāra philosophy to the Mādhyamika philosophy which he holds to be the highest of the Buddhist philosophies. From another point of view, Kamalaśīla establishes a soteriology for leading the followers of Yogācāra philosophy to the Mādhyamika philosophy, viz., the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth (*tattvajñāna*).⁷ Kamalaśīla's method for establishing this type of philosophical compatibility seems to be that he solves the problem of the doctrinal incompatibility between these two schools by offering those Mādhyamika interpretations which he made taking Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition and Kamalaśīla's *vastubalapravṛttānūmānas* as the reasons for those interpretations. Therefore, we should clarify the details of

⁷ Adopting the teaching of the one vehicle (*ekayāna*) which is the essentials of his soteriology, Kamalaśīla holds that everyone has the Buddha nature (*tathāgatagarbha*) and can attain the stage of the supreme and perfect enlightenment (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*). In order to attain that stage, however, one has to obtain the wisdom of truth (*tattvajñāna*). Kamalaśīla regards the “vehicle” (*yāna*) of the word “one vehicle” (*ekayāna*) as the means of attaining nirvāṇa, i.e., the wisdom which directly understands the truth consisting in the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of all dharmas. Therefore, the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth is the one and only vehicle which enables one to attain nirvāṇa. See MĀ D242b4-243a3: *sems can thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po (tathāgatagarbha) can no zhes bya ba 'dis kyang / thams cad bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) kyi go 'phang thob par rung ba nyid du yongs su bstan te / ... // de skad du bstan pas ni thams cad bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rang bzhin nyid du yongs su bstan pa yin no // gzhan yang theg pa (yāna) zhes bya ba ni mya ngan las 'das pa'i grong khyer (nirvāṇapūra: the city of nirvāṇa) du 'gro ba'i lam de kho na nyid shes pa'i bdag nyid la bya ste / 'di nas 'gro ba'i phyir ro // de kho na nyid shes pa kho nas thar pa thob par 'gyur gyi / gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // de kho na nyid de yang gcig kho nar zad de / ... // de'i phyir de kho na nyid ngo bo nyid gcig pa'i yul can gyi ye shes kyang ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho na yin no // ... // de lta bas na chos dang gang zag la bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid mngon sum pa'i ye shes gang yin pa de nyid mya ngan las 'das pa thob par byed pa'i yang dag pa'i lam yin gyi / gzhan ni ma yin pa de'i phyir theg pa ni gcig kho nar zad do //*. Although Kamalaśīla holds that the followers of Yogācāra philosophy and the Śrāvakas all have the Buddha nature, how can they obtain the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth in order to attain the stage of the supreme and perfect enlightenment? It is well known that Kamalaśīla, quoting LAS X kk. 256-257, explains his idea of the progress of meditation, i.e., gradualism. His idea of gradualism explains the process of obtaining the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth. For an English translation of LAS X kk. 256-257, see KEIRA (2004) p. 75. For Kamalaśīla's idea of gradualism, see KAJIYAMA (1978). According to his interpretation of LAS X kk. 256-257, Kamalaśīla seems to see meditation as involving the following stages: (1) In reliance upon the Yogācāra position (i.e., Satyākāravāda), yogins transcend the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions that external objects are really existent; (2) Taking the Alikākāravāda, i.e., the position that the aspects (*ākāra*) of cognition are deceptive and do not ultimately exist, yogins abide in the nondual cognition (*advayajñāna*) and transcend the Satyākāravāda, i.e., the position that the aspects of cognition are really existent; (3) Eliminating the attachment to the real existence of the nondual cognition, yogins abide in the Mādhyamika meditation and see the Mahāyāna, i.e., the ultimate reality (*paramatattva*). This idea of Kamalaśīla shows that by accepting and following his idea of gradualism, the Yogācāra yogins and the Śrāvaka yogins, i.e., the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika yogins, can abide in the Mādhyamika meditation and obtain the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth, with the result that they also will attain the stage of the supreme and perfect enlightenment. Therefore, Kamalaśīla's idea of gradualism can also be regarded as a soteriology for leading the followers of Yogācāra philosophy and the Śrāvakas to the Mādhyamika wisdom of truth.

Kamalaśīla's method of solving the problem of the doctrinal incompatibility and elucidate the structure and meaning of the philosophical compatibility which Kamalaśīla intends to establish. Otherwise, we will not completely understand the essential characteristics of his Mādhyamika philosophy.

In this article, we focus on the Yogācāra objection that one should understand the teaching of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) according to an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*), and that the Illustrious One (*bhagavat*) taught the *niḥsvabhāvatā* with the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures. Kamalaśīla cannot accept that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* would be a teaching to be understood according to an interpretative meaning because he holds that it is a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning. Then how will Kamalaśīla solve this doctrinal conflict? His solution is that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* taught with the intention (*abhiprāya*) of the three kinds of no-natures is also regarded as a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning. In the MĀ he clearly states that it is possible that a teaching with an intentional meaning (*abhiprāya*) expresses the definitive meaning.⁸ In order to elucidate the reasons of his solution, we, after analyzing the Yogācāra objection mentioned above, will analyze his interpretations of the definitive meaning (*nītārtha*) and the three kinds of no-natures. These analyses will allow us to say that these interpretations serve as the reasons for his solution and that these interpretations are all based upon the theory of valid cognition.

2. Analysis of the Yogācāra objection

In the MĀ the Yogācāra opponent makes the following objection:

In a certain scripture [i.e., *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*], it is said:

All dharmas are without intrinsic nature, unarisen, calm from the beginning, and completely extinguished by nature ... and so forth.

That [description] also should be understood according to an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*). This is because the teachings by the Illustrious One are effectuated with various intentions. In that [description the Illustrious One] says that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, with the intention of [explaining] that the three natures, i.e., imagined [nature], dependent [nature] and thoroughly established [nature], are void of [their] natures concerning characters, arising and the ultimate, respectively. Therefore, due to being without intrinsic nature, [all dharmas] are unarisen. Due to being [unarisen],

⁸ See MĀ D151b4: *de'i phyir dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //*. See p. 19.

they are calm from the beginning. Due to being [calm from the beginning], they are completely extinguished by nature. In this manner the Illustrious One himself, in the *Ārya Saṃdhinirmocana* and other [scriptures], explained the application of the intention of the [real] meaning of the scriptural [description teaching the absence of intrinsic nature].⁹

Following the descriptions of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (hereafter SNS), the Yogācāras say that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* taught in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and explained by the Mādhyamikas should be understood according to an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*), and that the Illustrious One teaches the *niḥsvabhāvatā* with the intention of explaining another meaning (*arthāntara*),¹⁰ i.e., the three kinds of no-natures: (1) the absence of nature concerning characters

⁹ MĀ D134a2-5: *mdo kha cig las chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa (D pa: P pa /) ma skyes pa gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung ba gang yin pa de yang drang ba'i don nyid du rtogs par bya ste / bcom (D bcom: P bcoms) ldan 'das kyi bstan pa ni dgongs pa sna tshogs kyi sgo nas 'jug pa'i phyir ro // de la ngo bo nyid gsum po kun brtags pa dang / gzhan gyi dbang dang / yongs su grub pa mams ni go rim (P rim: D rims) bzhin du mtshan nyid dang / skye ba dang / (D /: P om.) don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du gsungs te / de bas na ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ma skyes pa'o // de'i phyir gzod ma nas zhi ba'o // de'i phyir rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa ste / de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das nyid (D nyid: P om.) kyiis 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa la sogs pa las mdo'i don gyi dgongs pa sbyar ba bstan pa yin no //*

mdo kha cig las See SNS p. 66, 24-26: *chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa ... /* 『解深密經』 Taisho 16, 693c28-29: 世尊復說一切諸法皆無自性無生無滅本來寂靜自性涅槃。 See also NAGAO (1982) pp. 383-388 and MATSUSHITA (1987b) pp. (63)-(64), n. 14 and n. 15.

For the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* which should be understood according to an interpretative meaning, see SNS p. 75, 4-9: *don dam yang dag 'phags 'di la de bzhin gshegs pa ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid mam pa gsum po de dag nyid las dgongs nas drang ba'i don gyi mdo brjod pa'i rnam pas 'di lta ste / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes chos ston to /* . “Paramārthasamudgata! In the way that the scripture which [explains] an interpretative meaning is described, Tathāgata here, with the intention of those three kinds of no-natures, taught that all dharmas were without intrinsic nature, unarisen, undestroyed, calm from the beginning, completely extinguished by nature”

For the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures, see SNS p. 67, 26-30: *don dam yang dag 'phags ngas chos rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid mam pa gsum po 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bstan to /* . “Paramārthasamudgata! I taught that all dharmas were without intrinsic nature, with the intention of the three kinds of no-natures of all dharmas, that is to say, the absence of nature concerning characters, absence of nature concerning arising and absence of nature concerning the ultimate.” See also AS p. 696, 8-12: (p. 84, 11-15 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 15-18 in Gokhale edition:) *yad uktaṃ vaiḥpulye niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā iti / tatra ko 'bhisandhiḥ / ... / api khalu parikalpīte svabhāve lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvātām upādāya paratantre utpattiniḥsvabhāvātām upādāya pariniḥspanne paramārthanīḥsvabhāvātām upādāya //* . And see ASBh p. 679, 9-17 (p. 114, 20-26 in Tatia edition).

de bas na ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir... . See MSA XI p. 68, 1-2: *yo hi niḥsvabhāvāḥ so 'nutpanno yo 'nutpannāḥ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhāḥ sa ādiśānto ya ādiśāntāḥ sa prakṛtiparinirvṛta ... /* . Cf. AS p. 698, 10-13: (p. 84, 16-19 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 19-20 in Gokhale edition:) *yathā niḥsvabhāvās tathā anutpannāḥ / yathā anutpannās tathā aniruddhāḥ / yathā anutpannās cāniruddhās ca tathā ādiśāntāḥ / yathā ādiśāntās tathā prakṛtiparinirvṛtāḥ //* . See also MSA XI k. 51: (a Sanskrit reconstruction in LÉVI (1911) p. 122, 32-33:) *niḥsvabhāvātayā siddhā uttarottaranīśrayāt / anutpannāniruddhādiśāntaparakṛtinirvṛtāḥ //*

¹⁰ For the four kinds of intentions, i.e., intention of evenness (*samatābhīprāya*), intention of another meaning

(*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*), which is established with respect to the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), (2) the absence of nature concerning arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*), which is established with respect to the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) and (3) the absence of nature concerning the ultimate (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*), which is established with respect to the thoroughly established nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*).¹¹

Now, here, we need to mention the Yogācāra ideas of *nītārtha* and *neyārtha* in order to understand extensively the Yogācāra objection quoted above. It is already reported that most of the Yogācāra refutations appearing in the MĀ can be held to be based upon Vasubandhu's ideas explained in his *Vyākhyāyukti* (hereafter VY),¹² and that in his VY Vasubandhu holds

(*arthāntarābhiprāya*), intention of different times (*kālāntarābhiprāya*) and intention of the tendency of the individual (*pudgalāśayābhiprāya*), see MSA XII k. 18: *samatārthāntare jñeyas tathā kālāntare punaḥ / pudgalasyāśaye caiva abhiprāyaś caturvidhaḥ //*

For the intention of another meaning, see MSA XII p. 83, 2-3 (= ASBh p. 699, 7-9 (p. 115, 4-6 in Tatia edition)): *arthāntarābhiprāyo yad āha / niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā anutpannā ityevamādi ayathārutārthatvāt /* “The intention of another meaning [is shown] in statements such as when it is said: ‘all dharmas are without intrinsic nature and unarisen,’ for [such a statement should be understood] according to an unliteral meaning.” *Arthāntarābhiprāya* is regarded as the intention of explaining a meaning other than the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*).

¹¹ The three kinds of no-natures are established on the basis of the three natures. Due to this, the Yogācāras hold that the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* also means the establishment of the three natures. According to Sthiramati, the Illustrious One taught the absence of intrinsic nature (*ngo bo nyid med pa*) of all dharmas with the intention of the imagined nature, their nonarising and noncessation (*ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa*) with the intention of the dependent nature and their complete extinction in nature (*rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das pa*) with the intention of the thoroughly established nature. See SAVBh D242b3-5: *don gzhan gyi lden po ngag ni mdo dag las chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa dang ma skyes pa dang / ma 'gags pa dang / rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes gsungs pa yang thams cad nas thams cad du med pa'i don du lta ba ma yin gyi kun brtags kyi rang bzhin la dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par bshad / gzhan dbang la dgongs nas ni ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa zhes bshad / yongs su grub pa la dgongs nas ni chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes bshad do //*. Note that this idea of Sthiramati can be regarded as explaining the hidden or profound meaning concerning characters (*lakṣaṇābhisamḍhi*) which is one of the four kinds of profound meanings: *avatārābhisamḍhi*, *lakṣaṇābhisamḍhi*, *pratīpakṣābhisamḍhi* and *pariṇāmanābhisamḍhi*. See MSA p. 82, 16-17 (= ASBh p. 701, 5-6 (p. 115, 14-15 in Tatia edition)): *lakṣaṇābhisamḍhis triṣu parikalpitādisvabhāveṣu draṣṭavyo** *niḥsvabhāvānutpannādisarvadharmadeśanāt ... [*draṣṭavyaḥ in ASBh]*. “The profound meaning concerning characters should be understood with reference to three natures such as imagined [nature], due to the teaching that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature and unarisen and so forth.” See NAGAO (1982) p. 397, n. 3. For the four kinds of profound meanings, see MSA XII kk. 16-17 and p. 82, 13-25 and ASBh p. 2-20 (p. 115, 12-25 in Tatia edition).

Sthiramati says that when the Illustrious One teaches in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* and other scriptures that all things are nonexistent, one should not understand the teaching according to the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*), because the teaching means that the imagined nature is nonexistent. Sthiramati holds that although the imagined nature is nonexistent, the dependent nature and thoroughly established nature are existent. See SAVBh D19a1-3: *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa'i nang nas thams cad med par bshad pas sangs rgyas kyi tshig (buddhavacana) ma yin no zhes sems pa la / sgra gzhan phyir (rutānyatvāt) zhes smras te / bcom ldan 'das kyis shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs par med do zhes bshad pa de yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don ma yin te / ji ltar byis pa mams kyis gzung ba dang 'dzin par kun tu brtags pa'i rang bzhin med pa la dgongs nas med do zhes gsungs ste / gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo ni med pa ma yin pa ste / ... //*

¹² See MATSUSHITA (1987a)(1987b). In the fourth chapter of the VY, Vasubandhu quotes and examines twenty-eight wrong views (*aṣṭāvīṃśatir asaddiṣṭaya*), such as view on signs (*nimittadīṣṭi*), which are explained in the *theg pa chen po'i mdo dod pa chan po skye ba* (or *theg pa chen po la dod pa / dad pa cher 'bhung gi mdo*), i.e., *Ārya Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanasūtra* or *Mahādharmādarśa*. In the MĀ Kamalaśīla also quotes and

that the definitive meaning (*nītārtha*) should be the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*) and the interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*) is not literally understood.¹³ This can be understood, for example, in the following description in the fourth chapter of the VY:

I will examine whether these [teachings of the Mahāyāna should be understood] according to an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*) or according to the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*)

Therefore, one should not determine [words such as *nīḥsvabhāvatā*] according to the literal meaning of these words. This is because [otherwise] these would be contradictory with other scriptures. If you say: “How [should one determine these words]?” [we reply that] one [should determine them] as having an intentional meaning (*ābhiprāyika*). Take the following for example: the verse saying: “Having killed his mother and father (*mātaraṃ pītaraṃ hatvā*) ...” and the verse saying: “[The person who] is unbelieving and ungrateful (*āsraddho 'kṛtajñāś ca*)” Since the definitive meanings are not taught in these verses, one should also not determine [the verses] according to their literal meanings. This is because [otherwise] they would be contradictory with other scriptures. If you say: “How [should one determine them]?” [we reply that] one [should determine them] as having intentional meanings (*ābhiprāyika*).¹⁴

examines this sūtra's twenty-eight wrong views. See fn. 16. Moreover, Kamalaśīla quotes and examines most of the scriptural descriptions which Vasubandhu quotes in the fourth chapter of the VY as the teachings to be understood according to their definitive meanings (*nītārtha*). Due to these facts, we can understand that in the MĀ Kamalaśīla analyzes the Yogācāra ideas explained in the fourth chapter of the VY.

For the name of the sūtra, i.e., *theḡ pa chen po'i mdo dod pa chan po skye ba* (=Ārya Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanasūtra), see MATSUDA (1986).

¹³ See MATSUDA (1983), HONJO (1989) and LEE (2001) pp. 79-83.

¹⁴ VY D99b7-101a2: *ci 'di bkri ba'i don nam / 'on te sgra ji bzhin gyi don yin zhes dpyad par bya ste / ... / de lta bas na tshig de rnam kyī sgra ji bzhin gyi don du nges par gzung bar mi bya ste / mdo sde gzhan dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'o na ci zhe na / dgongs pa can yin no // dper na / pha dang ma ni bsad byad shing / zhes bya ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'di dang / ma dad byas pa mi shes dang // zhes bya ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'di la nges pa'i don bshad pa med par yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don du nges par gzung par mi bya ste / mdo sde gzhan dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'o na ci zhe na / dgongs pa can yin no //*. See HONJO (1990) and MATSUDA (1983).

pha dang ma ni bsad byad shing / This phrase is identified with *Udānavarga* XXIX-24a. The whole verse is quoted in the VY D91a-b1. The Sanskrit text is found in the AS p. 940, 5-6: (p. 107, 1-2 in Pradhan edition:) *mātaraṃ pītaraṃ hatvā rājānaṃ dvau bahuśrutau / rāṣṭraṃ sānucaraṃ hatvā naro viśuddha ucyaṭe //* “It is said that having killed his mother and father and the king and the two well-informed [Brahmans], and having conquered the kingdom with its officials, the person will be pure.” This verse has a hidden meaning (*abhisaṃdhi*). For example, the stanza *mātaraṃ pītaraṃ hatvā* means “having destroyed his craving (*tṣṇā*) and existence consisting in karma (*karmabhava*).” That is, The mother is regarded as *tṣṇā*, and the father is regarded as *karmabhava*. See ASBh p. 941, 12-15 (p. 155, 14-17 in Tatia edition) and VY D97b5. In his *Udānavargavivarāṇa*, Prajñāvarman regards the mother as “ignorance” (*avidyā*) and the father as “conditioning factors” (*saṃskāra*). See HONJO *ibid.* p. 69, n. 4) and ROCKHILL (1975) pp. 210, 16-212, 17. There is also another interpretation that the father is regarded as the idea of identity (*nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal; asmimāna*). See VY D97b5.

ma dad byas pa mi shes dang / This phrase is identified with *Udānavarga* XXIX-23a. The Sanskrit text of that verse is found in the AS p. 944, 3-4: (p. 107, 3-4 in Pradhan edition:) *āsraddho 'kṛtajñāś ca sandhicchedi ca yo naraḥ / hatāvakaśo vāntaśaḥ sa vai uttamapuruṣaḥ //* “The person who is unbelieving, who is ungrateful, who

Vasubandhu here says that what is not the interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*), i.e., the definitive meaning (*nitārtha*), should be understood as the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*). On the other hand, he says that what is not the definitive meaning, i.e., the interpretative meaning, should not be understood as the literal meaning. That is to say, whether one should understand a scripture's description according to the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*) or according to an unliteral meaning (*ayathārutārtha*) serves as the criterion for judging whether the description explains the definitive meaning or an interpretative meaning. Just as in the case of the Yogācāra idea that the Illustrious One teaches the *niḥsvabhāvatā* with the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures, the teaching with the intention (*abhiprāya*) of explaining a meaning other (*arthāntara*) than the literal meaning should be understood according to an unliteral meaning, viz., according to an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*).

The Yogācāra objection quoted earlier means that the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* should be understood not according to the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*) but according to an unliteral meaning (*ayathārutārtha*). Vasubandhu holds that when one understands that teaching according to an unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures established on the basis of the three natures, one will understand the middle way consisting in the exclusion of the two extremes which are superimposition (*samāropa/āropa*) and denial (*apavāda*).¹⁵ However, those who understand that teaching according to the literal meaning will make philosophical or doctrinal errors: They will have the twenty-eight wrong views explained in the *Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanasūtra*¹⁶ and deny both defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*);¹⁷ They will also not understand the middle way.

steals by housebreaking, who destroys chances and who eats vomited things, is indeed an excellent man.” See VY D101b1 and ASBh p. 945, 2-11 (p. 155, 23-30 in Tatia edition). This verse also has a hidden meaning. For example, *asraddha* means that the person does not accept the things which others say, because he knows them by means of his own direct cognition (*svapratyayatvāt*). *akṛtājñā* is regarded as the person who understands the unconditioned complete extinction (*asamskṛtanirvāṇajñāna*). See ASBh p. 945, 14-15 (p. 156, 2-3 in Tatia edition). See also HONJO *ibid.* pp. 69-70, n. 19).

¹⁵ See VY D107a6-b2: *chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa / ma skyes pa ma 'gags pa zhes bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa 'di yang bshad par bya'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / byis pas kun du brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid yod pa nyid du 'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir ro // ranb bzhin gyis mig skyon can du gyur ba dag la kun tu brtags pa'i rang bzhin de yod pa nyid du 'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir de med pa nyid yin pa dang 'dra bar de sgra ji bzhin gyi don ma yin no zhes 'di skad kyang gdon mi za bar bshad par bya'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / mgo smos pa mi shes pa mams brjod du med pa'i ngo bo'i chos med par 'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir ro // de lta na kha cig ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha' dang / kha cig ni skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' spangs pa yin no //*

¹⁶ For the VY's quotation of the *Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanasūtra*'s twenty-eight wrong views, see VY D102a3-104b6. Cf. MĀ D144a7-145a1. Those twenty-eight wrong views are also quoted in the AS p. 688, 11-16 (p. 84, 5-10 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 10-14 in Gokhale edition). For the explanation of those wrong views, see ASBh pp. 689, 2- 695, 13 (pp. 112, 20-114, 13 in Tatia edition). For the name of this scripture, see fn. 12.

¹⁷ See VY D110a4-b1: *yang theg pa chen po pa kha cig thams cad rang gi mtshan nyid du ni med pa kho na yin la / kun rdzob tu ni bcom ldan 'das kyis chos mams yod pa nyid du bstan to zhes sgra ji bzhin pa nyid kyi don yin par brjod pa yang yin pa de dag la ji skad bstan pa'i brtsad pa 'di yang 'byung bar 'gyur ro // kun rdzob ces bya ba yang brjod pa yin la / de yang kun nas nyon mongs pa dang mthun pa nyes par bshad pa zhes bya ba la / nam par*

In the MĀ Kamalaśīla regards Vasubandhu's ideas as explained above as the Yogācāra objections against the Mādhyamika philosophy and replies to them. The Yogācāras raise various objections. However, the Yogācāra idea that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* is a teaching to be understood according to an interpretative meaning is the fundamental problem in this case which causes the doctrinal conflict between the two schools. That is, the Mādhyamikas who hold the *niḥsvabhāvatā* to be the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) cannot accept this idea of the Yogācāra. This is because, for the Mādhyamikas, the meaning of that teaching is already clearly established or determined (*nīta*) as the ultimate and because it is unacceptable for them that that teaching should be interpreted (*neya*) in different manners.¹⁸

3. Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*

Kamalaśīla undertakes new(?) interpretations of *nītārtha* and *neyārtha* in order to establish the idea that a teaching's intentional meaning (*abhiprāya*) which is other than the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*) is not necessarily the *neyārtha*. This idea gives the Mādhyamikas occasion to invalidate the Yogācāra idea that an intentional meaning other than the literal meaning, viz., *arthāntarābhiprāya*, would necessarily be the *neyārtha* because that meaning is unliterally understood. It is said in the MĀ:

① It is also not correct to say: “The Illustrious One's statements which show the [absence of intrinsic nature can] not be found at all.” That is, the Illustrious One said that one [should] rely upon the scripture [explaining] the definitive meaning, and did not [say] that one should rely upon the scripture [explaining] an interpretative meaning. If you say: “What is the definitive meaning?” [we reply that] it is established by means of valid cognition and is explained with reference to the ultimate, for it is impossible that the [meaning] would lead us to any other [state] than the [ultimate]. Now, the nonarising of all dharmas is established by means of valid cognition. Therefore, due to [its] being

byang ba dang mthun pa ni legs par bshad pa zhes bya ba yin no zhe na / brjod pa tsam du zad na ji ltar na legs par bshad pa'am / nyes par bshad par 'gyur / kun rdzob kyang kha cig gdon mi za bar dngos su khas blang bar bya bar 'gyur ro // yang na de yang med na ni ji ltar kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid du gsungs pa yin / kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / mam par byang ba thams cad la skur pa btab pas gnas dang gnas ma yin pa gnyis la mi gnas pa'i phyir dang / rang gis rang smra ba bkag pa'i phyir brjod du med par 'gyur ro // dgongs pa can yin par smra ba na ni nyes pa 'di dag tu mi 'gyur ro //

¹⁸ For Candrakīrti's idea that Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakāśāstra* was composed to show the distinction between *nītārthasūtras* and *neyāthasūtras*, see PrasP pp. 40-41: *yata evaṃ nirodhādayaḥ pratīyasamutpādasyopalabhyante / ata evedaṃ madhyamakāśāstraṃ praṇītaṃ ācāryeṇa neyanītārthasūtrāntavibhāgopadarśanārthaṃ /*. See also MA VI k. 97d: *stong nyid don can nges don shes par gyis /*. Differently from Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka did not seem to examine the problem of *nītārtha*, *neyārtha* and *abhiprāya* extensively. See EJIMA (1980) p. 139, n. (25). In the MĀ Kamalaśīla clearly says that the absence of intrinsic nature is a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning.

established by means of reasoning, it is termed: “ultimate.”¹⁹

② It should be understood that just the statement about the ultimate expresses the definitive meaning, and [the statement about] the opposite [of the ultimate] expresses an interpretative meaning.²⁰

According to his interpretations of *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*, the definitive meaning expresses the ultimate truth consisting in the absence of intrinsic nature, or nonarising of all dharmas which the Mādhyamikas determined by means of valid cognition, i.e., the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* stating the five reasons. On the other hand, the interpretative meaning expresses the convention (*saṃvṛti*) which is the opposite of the ultimate.

Here, it should be noticed that in those interpretations of Kamalaśīla, he does not adopt the Yogācāra idea that the definitive meaning should be the literal meaning (*yathārutārtha*) and the interpretative meaning expresses an unliteral meaning (*ayathārutārtha*) although Kamalaśīla and the Yogācāras seem to have the same idea that the intentional meaning (*abhiprāya*) is unliterally understood.²¹ This means that the idea of the intentional meaning that should be unliterally understood is separated from the ideas of definitive meaning and interpretative meaning. Therefore, Kamalaśīla can say that the unliteral and intentional meaning of a teaching is not necessarily the *neyārtha*, and that when its unliteral and intentional meaning expresses the ultimate, that meaning can be the *nītārtha*.

Moreover, it should also be noticed that Kamalaśīla holds that valid cognitions, i.e., in this context, his *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* stating the five reasons, serve as the reason for judging

¹⁹ MĀ D148b6-149a1: *de ston par byed pa'i bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' med pa nyid do (D do: P do //) zhes brjod par yang rigs pa ma yin te / 'di ltar bcom ldan 'das kyi nges pa'i don gyi mdo la brten par gsungs kyi / drang ba'i don la ni ma yin no // nges pa'i don kyang gang la bya zhe na / tshad ma dang bcas pa dang / don dam pa'i dbang du mdzad nas bshad pa gang yin pa ste de ni de las logs shig gzhan gang du yang drang bar mi nus pa'i phyir ro // chos thams cad mi skye ba yang tshad mas yang dag par grub ste / de nyid kyi phyir de ni rigs pa dang ldan pa nyid kyi don dam pa zhes bya'o //*

nges pa'i don gyi mdo la brten par gsungs See AKBh p. 465, 16-17: *nītārtham ca sūtram pratisaraṇam ...* /. See also SA p. 704, 21-22: *nītārthasūtram pratisaraṇam na neyārtham*.

See MĀ D233a7-b1: *skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang dag pa'i tshad mas kun tu gtan la phab cing sgro ma btags pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa'i bden pa zhes bya'o //*. “It is said that the ultimate truth is the nonarising and so forth which are determined by means of genuinely valid cognition and are not superimposed.”

²⁰ MĀ D149b4-5: *don dam pa brjod pa kho na nges pa'i don yin la / bzlog pa ni drang ba'i don yin no zhes bya bar khong du chud par bya'o //*.

²¹ See, for example, MĀ D151a6: *yang de lta bas na ngas mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams cad ma skyes pa'o (D pa'o: P pa'o //) zhes bshad do zhes gsungs pa gang yin pa der yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don du yongs su rtog pa de sel bar yang mdzad la / ...* . For an English translation, see p. 17. See also MĀ D151b3-4: *de'i phyir skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa nges pa'i don yin no // de ni don dam pa la dgongs nas bstan pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba yang ma yin la / sgra ji bzhin du yongs su rtog pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //*. For an English translation, see p.19. Note that *abhiprāya* here should be regarded as *arthāntarābhiprāya*, i.e., the intention of a meaning other than the literal meaning. See fn. 10.

whether the meaning of a scripture's description is the *nītārtha* or not. That is, one can determine the meaning of the following description as the *nītārtha*: the description explaining the ultimate consisting in the *niḥsvabhāvatā* established by means of the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* stating the five reasons, i.e., the “diamond-splinters” reason and other four reasons. One can rely upon such a description. However, the meaning of the following description is not the *nītārtha*: the description of which the meaning is contradictory with the thing established by means of the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas*. Such a description is not reliable. Therefore, it seems clear that Kamalaśīla's way of judging whether the meaning of a scripture's description is the *nītārtha* or not is based upon Dharmakīrti's idea of the second investigation (2) of the above-explained threefold investigation for determining scriptural authority.²² And precisely this can be held to be Kamalaśīla's reason for not following the Yogācāra idea that the definitive meaning should be the literal meaning and the interpretative meaning expresses an unliteral meaning.

Now, when the determination of the meaning of a scripture's description is not established, one cannot judge whether or not its meaning is contradictory with the thing established by means of the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas*. The determination of its meaning is indispensable for judging that. However, when its meaning is determined, it will not necessarily be the literal meaning. That is, when one should understand a scripture's description according to an unliteral meaning, then, understanding its intended unliteral meaning, one should judge whether the meaning is not contradictory with the thing established by means of the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas*. In this case just its intended unliteral meaning is the description's actual meaning which one should examine to judge whether it is contradictory or not. Therefore, the examination of whether the meaning should be understood literally or unliterally cannot be held to serve as the criterion for judging whether the meaning is contradictory with the *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* or not, i.e., for judging whether the meaning expresses the *nītārtha* or not.

The above will be supported by Dharmakīrti's theory of inference. That is, when one determines the reliability of a scripture's statement about the *niḥsvabhāvatā* by means of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, what the statement asserts should be treated as the proposition to be proved, i.e., the statement of the thesis (*pakṣavacana*). This is because in the Buddhist epistemology verbal knowledge (*śabda*) is not a different *pramāṇa* from inference and is regarded as a case of inference.²³ When the statement's assertion is treated as the statement of the thesis, this thesis-statement should follow Dharmakīrti's idea of the defining characteristic of

²² See pp. 1-2.

²³ See PS V, k. 1: *na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat / kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* // (This verse is quoted in the TSP p. 441, 6-7.) English translation in HATTORI (2000) p. 139, 4-10: “That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because it [viz., a word] expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as [the inferential mark (*liṅga*)] ‘*kṛtakatva*’ (producedness) or the like [establishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark].”

the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*). Dharmakīrti says: “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as something to be proved (*sādhyā*)]” (*svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo*).²⁴ Commenting on this defining characteristic of the thesis, he says in the PV IV kk. 28-29 that by means of the word *iṣṭa* (intended), one understands that the thesis is stated according to the [real] sense (*arthokta*), and that even though not explicitly stated, what is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the proponent's intention (*icchā*) is held to be the *sādhyā*, i.e., the actual thesis.²⁵ He also says in the PV IV k. 16 that the thesis-statement is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) for revealing the speaker's intention (*abhiprāya*).²⁶ Therefore, the proposition intended by the proponent is the actual thesis even though it is not explicitly stated. For example, the Sāṃkhya, in order to prove the existence of the Spirit (*puruṣa*), states the following proposition: “The eyes and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another (*parārtha*).” However, what the Sāṃkhya actually intends by the word *parārtha*, but does not say, is the following proposition: “The eyes and other [faculties, i.e., the derivatives of the Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*),] are for the use of the Self (*ātman*) [i.e., the Spirit (*puruṣa*)].” This intended proposition should be examined as the Sāṃkhya's actual thesis.²⁷ Therefore, when the Sāṃkhya's proposition should not literally be understood, even then, understanding the Sāṃkhya's intended proposition, one should judge whether the intended proposition is true or not. Therefore, whether the Sāṃkhya's proposition should be understood literally or unliterally does not serve as the criterion for judging whether their proposition is true or not.

Thus, it can be held that Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the thesis made it possible for

²⁴ English translation follows TILLEMANS (2000) p. 4, 21-24.

²⁵ PV IV, kk. 28-29: *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asaṃmohāya lakṣaṇam / tac caturlakṣaṇam rūpanipāteṣṭasvayaṃpadaiḥ // asiddhāsādhanārthoktavādyabhyupagatagrahaḥ / anukto 'picchayā vyāptāḥ sādhyā ātmārthavan mataḥ //* English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 48, 8-19: “Although the statement of what is to be proved (*sādhyā* = *pakṣa*) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic [of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [*sādhyā*] has four characteristics: By means of the words ‘proper form’ (*rūpa*), ‘alone’ (*nipāta* ‘particle’ = *eva*), ‘intended’ (*iṣṭa*) and ‘himself’ (*svayam*), one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a *sādhana*, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (*vādin*). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhyā*, as in [the Sāṃkhya's] argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the benefit of the Self (*ātman*).”

See also PV IV k. 31cd: *anuktāv api vāñchāyā bhavet prakaraṇād gatiḥ //* English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 52, 7-9: “Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakaraṇa*).”

²⁶ PV IV k. 16: *tat pakṣavacanam vaktur abhiprāyanivedane / pramāṇam saṃśayotpattes tataḥ sāksān na sādhanam //* English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 27, 6-9: “So the thesis-statement is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) for revealing the speaker's intention. [But] as doubt arises from it [as to whether the thesis is true or not], it is not directly (*sāksāt*) a means of proof (*sādhana*).”

²⁷ See TILLEMANS ibid. p. 50, 7-15 and fn. 177. See also NB III-47: *yathā parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātāvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / atrātmārthā ity anuktāv apy ātmārthatā sādhyā / tena noktāmātram eva sādhyam --- ity uktam bhavati //* And see NBṬ p. 180, 15: *tadvad atra pramāṇe yad apy ātmārthās cakṣurādaya ity ātmārthatā noktā anuktāv apy ātmārthatā sādhyā /*

Kamalaśīla to hold that the examination of whether a description's meaning should be understood literally or unliterally did not serve as the criterion for judging whether it was the *nītārtha* or not. When one should understand the description according to an unliteral meaning, its intended unliteral meaning should be regarded as the actual meaning and be examined in order to judge whether it is the *nītārtha* or not. Therefore, its intended unliteral meaning is not necessarily the *neyārtha*.

4. Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the three kinds of no-natures

After explaining his own interpretations of *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*, Kamalaśīla clearly states in the MĀ that the Mādhyamikas also accept the establishment of the three natures and three kinds of no-natures. He says:

[Objection:] If that were to be so [i.e., if the *nītārtha* were to be regarded as expressing the ultimate truth consisting in the nonarising], then how would the Illustrious One teach in the *Ārya Saṃdhinirmoḍcana* that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, with the intention of [explaining] the three kinds of no-natures [which are established on the basis of] the three natures?

[Reply:] This is not a fault. Those who make a denial of the conventional natures, whose minds became confused from the attachment to [things] such as the hearing of untrue treatises, who superimpose the permanent and [impermanent natures of] entities upon the completely deceptive things which do not exist [even] conventionally and who incorrectly grasp things like visible matter just as they appear, cannot enter an ocean of the very profound ultimate doctrine which is free of the two extremes, due to their minds having fallen into the two extremes of superimposition and denial. Therefore, for this reason, the Illustrious One showed the middle way free of the two extremes by stating the idea of nonarising and so forth just from the ultimate (*paramārtha*) point of view and by showing his intention of [explaining] the three kinds of no-natures. Therefore, [the Illustrious One] established the doctrine that [the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*' and other scriptures' statements about the nonarising express] just the definitive meaning. The Mādhyamikas also do accept the establishment of the three natures. Otherwise, how could they avoid the [fallacy of] being contradictory with empirical [objects] (*dr̥ṣṭāvirodha*)?²⁸

²⁸ MĀ D149b6-150a4: *gal te de lta yin na / 'o na ji ltaṅ bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa las / ngo bo nyid gsum po ngo bo nyid med pa rnam pa (D pa: P om.) gsum las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo*

Although Kamalaśīla says that the Mādhyamikas accept the three natures and three kinds of no-natures, it is impossible for the Mādhyamikas to accept the genuine Yogācāra ideas concerning them. Kamalaśīla interprets them as being compatible with the Mādhyamika philosophy. In the subsequent three items, we will analyze his interpretation of the three kinds of no-natures, i.e., the absence of nature concerning arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā*), the absence of nature concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvātā*) and the absence of nature concerning the ultimate (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvātā*). Our analysis will clarify Kamalaśīla's idea that when one should understand the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvātā* according to an intended unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures, the teaching's intended meaning (*abhiprāya*) can also be the *nītārtha*, because that intended meaning also expresses the ultimate.

a. *Utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā*

Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *paratantrasvabhāva* and *utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā* are as follows:

Of the [three natures], the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is the entity (*dnegos po*) which is acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not conducted, which is

bo nyid med par bstan zhe (D zhe: P ce) na / 'di ni nyes ba med de / gang dag kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo nyid la yang skur pa 'debs par byed pa dang / dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mnyan pa la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pas blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur pa gang dag kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa brdzun pa kho na la yang rtag pa la sogs pa'i dnegos por sgra 'dogs shing (D shing: P shing /) gzugs la sogs pa ji ltar snang ba yang ji lta ba de bzhin du yongs su 'dzin par 'gyur ba de dag sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' gnyis su lhung ba'i blos don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgya mtsho mtha' gnyis dang bral ba shin tu zab mo la mi 'jug pas de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbang du mdzad pa kho nar brjod cing ngo bo nyid med pa mam pa gsum gyi dgongs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gnyis dang bral ba rab tu bstan pa'i phyir nges pa'i don kho na gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no // dbu ma pa mams kyang ngo bo nyid gsum mam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) pa khas mi len pa ni ma yin te / gzhan du na mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba ji ltar spongs par 'gyur /.

For the opponent's objection, see SNS p. 67, 26-30. See fn. 9. See also *Triṃśikā* k. 23: *trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhām niḥsvabhāvātām / samdhāya sarvadharmāpām deśitā niḥsvabhāvātā //*

Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayākara Gupta's MMA D138b1-4, P166b6-167a4: *gang mams kun rdzob pa'i rang bzhin la yang (D yang: P 'ang) skur pa 'debs par byed pa dang / gang dam pa ma (P dam pa ma: D dam pa) yin pa'i bstan bcos nyan pa la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pas blo gros phyin ci log can mams / kun rdzob yod pa ma yin pa brdzun pa kho na la rtag pa la sogs pa'i dnegos por sgra 'dogs shing gzugs la sogs pa ji ltar snang ba yang (D yang: P 'ang) ji lta ba de ltar* yongs su 'dzin par byed pa de mams sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs pa'i mthar lhung ba'i blos mtha' gnyis dang bral ba'o (D ba'o: P ba'o //) zhes ji lta ba bzhin du don dam pa'i tshul gyi (D gyi: P gyis) rgya mtsho shin tu zab mo la mi 'jug pas de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyis dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo** skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbang du byas pa nyid kho nar gsal par mdzad cing ngo bo nyid med par (D par: P pa mam pa) mam pa gsum gyi dgongs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gnyis dang bral ba*** nges pa'i don kho nar gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad do //* (*The word *bden* par is inserted in the P edition as a comment (*mchan*) on the term *ji lta ba de ltar*. ** MMA adds *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*. *** MMA omits *rab tu bstan pa'i phyir*.)

ngo bo nyid med par mam pa gsum gyi ... This sentence is quoted in the Lam rim. See NAGAO (1954) p. 166, 14-15.

nges pa'i don kho na gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no. See BNJ 75b4: *yum gyi mdo la sogs pa nges don gyi mdo kho na yin pa'i gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa'i phyir /.*

just as it appears and which just like illusions, arises dependently. Just like illusions, the [dependent nature] also arises conventionally by the force of other conditions, and does not [arise from the thing] itself alone. Therefore, it is established as being without nature concerning arising.²⁹

This idea of the *utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā*, which Kamalaśīla explains on the level of the conventional truth, is also found in the SNS and other texts.³⁰ However, Kamalaśīla also gives another interpretation of the *utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā* from the standpoint of the Mādhyamika philosophy or on the level of the ultimate truth. That is, the Mādhyamikas hold that what is produced depending upon its conditions is ultimately void of intrinsic nature, and therefore the dependent nature is not an ultimately or really existing nature (*yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid*). It is not different from the illusions which do not arise ultimately. Therefore, it is established as being without nature concerning arising.³¹ This interpretation of the *utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā*

²⁹ MĀ D150a4-5: *de la dngos po ma brtags na grags pa (D pa: P om.) ji ltar snang ba sgyu ma bzhin du brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no // de yang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bzhin du gzhan gyi rkyen gyi dbang gis skye'i / bdag nyid kho na ni ma yin pas skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du mam par gzhang (D gzhang: P bzhag) ste /*

Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayākara Gupta's MMA D138b4: *de la gang ma brtags na yid ches pa mthong ba ji lta ba sgyu ma bzhin du rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i dngos po de gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do // de yang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma ltar pha rol rkyen gyi stobs kyis skye'i rang bzhin kho na ni ma yin pas skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du mam par gzhang ste /*

Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *paratantrasvabhāva* means that the *paratantrasvabhāva* is the correct convention (*tathyaśamvṛtī*). See MAK 64: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zin // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus nmams kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //*. “One [should] understand that the [correct] convention is [the entity] itself which is acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not conducted, which possesses the properties of arising and cessation and which is the capacity for practical efficacy.” See also MAV ad k. 64 D70b7-71a1: *mthong ba dang 'dod pa'i dngos po rten cing 'brel par byung ba nmams ni brtag mi bzod pas yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ste /*. “The empirical and acceptable entities which arise dependently are the correct convention, because they cannot endure analytical investigation.” Although the term *don byed nus pa* (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) does not appear in Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *paratantrasvabhāva*, his words *dngos po ... ji ltar snang ba* can be regarded as meaning the entity as the capacity for practical efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) which is just as it appears. See SDVV ad k. 8abc D5b4: *dngos po tsam gang yin pa de ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro //*. See also SDVP D23b3: *dngos po tsam nyid kyi gtan tshigs ni don byed nus pa ste / 'di yang ji ltar snang ba bzhin du yin gyi / ... //*. Jñānagarbha says in his SDVK 8abc: *brtags pa'i don gyis dben gyur pa // dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te // yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya //*. “The mere entity which is void of imagined things and arises dependently should be understood as the correct convention.” He also says in the SDVV D5b4: *rgyu dang rkyen nmams la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par shes par bya ste /*. Cf. MĀ D2305-6: *gang yang rten cing 'brel par 'byung pa dang rjes su mthun pa rab tu brtags pa / ... de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu yod ces bya'o //*. In his *dBu ma snang ba'i 'grel pa* (BNG), Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge says that the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is the false convention (*mithyāsāṃvṛtī*) and the dependent nature is the correct convention. See BNG 22a1(307,1): *kun brtags pa log pa'i kun rdzob yin la gzhan dbang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin pas ... //*

³⁰ See SNS p. 68, 11-13: *de ni rkyen gzhan gyi stobs kyis byung ba yin gyi / bdag nyid kyis ni ma yin pas de'i phyir skye ba ngo bo nid med pa nyid zhes bya'o //*. See also ASBh p. 697, 10-13: (p. 114, 21-23 in Tatia edition:) *paratantrasya svayam utpattir nāsti pratyayāpekṣaṇād ato nāsyā svena bhāvena bhāva ity utpattiniḥsvabhāvātayā niḥsvabhāvaḥ ...*

³¹ MĀ D150a5: *mkhas pa nmams ni brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid do zhes bya bar nges par 'dzin te ... //* MĀ D150b7-151a1: *de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni yang dag pa'i ngo bo*

means that the dependent nature itself does not ultimately arise and is nonexistent on the level of the ultimate truth.

b. *Lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*

The *parikalpitasvabhāva* and *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā* are interpreted as follows:

The imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is superimposed as an ultimate intrinsic nature, such as permanent one and impermanent one, just upon the dependent nature which is not different from illusions and so forth. The [imagined nature] is also unestablished as [having] the characters as they are imagined, and therefore it is established as being without nature concerning characters. This absence of nature is also objectively (*vastutas*) established just with regard to the dependent nature. This is because one imagines the same [dependent nature] as being characterized as the [permanent ultimate nature and so forth].³²

When one understands the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* according to its intentional

nyid du rigs pa ma yin te / de lta na ni sgyu ma la sogs pa yang dngos po nyid du thal bar 'gyur te / de dag kyang rkyen la rag las par khyad par med pa'i phyir ro // de bas na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid 'di sgyu ma dang khyad par med pa nyid kyi phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) go // “Therefore, it is not correct that the dependent nature [would be] a really [existing] nature. If it were to be so, it would follow absurdly that illusions and so forth also would be real. This is because those also are not different [from real entities] in depending upon their conditions. Therefore, due to the fact that this dependent nature is not different from illusions, it is established as being without nature concerning arising.”

In the BNG, Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge says that taking objection to the idea of Sthiramati, Kamalaśīla said: “Therefore, it is not correct that the dependent nature [would be] a really [existing] nature.” See BNG 21a2(305,2): *slob dpon blo brtan la rten 'brel gyi rtags las don dam pa'i dngos por dpog pa ma nges pa ni de'i phyir zhes pa ste ... /* Sthiramati hold that although the imagined nature is nonexistent, the dependent nature and thoroughly established nature are existent. See fn. 11.

³² MĀ D151a2-3: *gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid sgyu ma la sogs pa dang khyad par med pa de nyid la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa don dam pa pa'i rang gi ngo bor sgro 'dogs pa (D 'dogs pa: P 'dogs pa btags pa) gang yin pa de ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid do // de yang ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) go // ngo bo nyid med pa 'di yang dngos su na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kho na la rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) ste / de nyid la de'i mtshan nyid du nye bar brtags pa'i phyir ro //*

Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayākara Gupta's MMA D138b5-7, P167a7-167b1: *gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid [sgyu ma lta bu] de kho na la gang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i rang bzhin don dam pa par [gang zag dang chos kyi bdag tu] sgro 'dogs pa de kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid do // [kun brtags] de 'ang (P de 'ang: D de'i 'di) ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid ma [don la] grub pa'i phyir / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag go // ngo bo nyid med pa 'di yang (D yang: P 'ang) dngos por na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kho na la rnam par gzhag ste [gzhan dbang] de kho na la [rtag mi rtag sogs] de'i mtshan nyid du brtags pa'i phyir ro //* (The words in the square brackets [] are comments (*mchan*) inserted in the P edition.)

The imagined nature is regarded as the false convention (*mithyāsamvṛti*), since ultimate intrinsic natures and so forth are established by means of imagination. See BNG 22a1(307,1) and fn. 29. See also SDVK 8d: *yang dag min ni (SDVV min ni: SDVK ma yin) kun brtags yin //* “Just the imagined things are the false [convention].” And see SDVV ad k. 8d D5b6-7: *yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa gang yin pa de ni rtag pa'i bzos sbyar ba ste / de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o //* “Real arising and so forth are constructed by means of imagination, and they are the false conventional truth.”

unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the *lakṣaṇāniḥsvabhāvatā* and *parikalpitasvabhāva*, then due to its intentional meaning, conventional natures and conventional arising are not denied. Therefore, that teaching can be understood as explaining the exclusion of the extreme of denial (*apavāda*). It is said:

Moreover, [it is said in the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*:]

Therefore, with the intention of the absence of nature concerning characters, I taught that all dharmas did not arise.

In that [description] also, [the Illustrious One] denies understanding [the nonarising] according to its literal meaning; establishing that the conventional dependent nature is void of imagined natures as explained earlier, he also shows undeniable conventional natures, and does not [show] ultimate [natures].³³

Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the *lakṣaṇāniḥsvabhāvatā* shows the establishment of dharmas' undeniable conventional dependent nature which is void of superimposed ultimate intrinsic natures. Therefore, this also means that he accepts the establishment of both defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*), because he holds that these two should be established on the level of the conventional truth or correct convention (*tathyasamvṛti*).³⁴

³³ MĀ D151a6-7: *yang de lta bas na ngas mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams cad ma skyes pa'o (D pa'o: P pa'o //) zhes bshad do zhes gsungs pa gang yin pa der yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don du yongs su rtog pa de sel bar yang mdzad la / gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la ji skad bshad pa'i kun brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis dben pa sgrub cing skur ba mi 'debs pa'i kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yang ston pa yin gyi / don dam pa nyid du ni ma yin no //.*

SNS pp. 69, 33-70, 2: *de'i phyir mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la dgongs nas ngas chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ... zhes bstan to /.*

See MĀ D153a7-b1: *gzhan gyi dbang kun rdzob tu skye ba'i phyir dang / de la brten nas sprul pas sprul pa bzhin du mam par rtog pa gzhan skye ba'i phyir de bas na / gzhan gyi dbang la brten nas su // mi mams kyi ni mam rtog skye // zhes gsungs so // 'dis ni skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' bsal ba yin te / kun rdzob pa'i skye ba la skur pa mi 'debs pa'i phyir ro //.* "Because the dependent [nature] arises conventionally and because in reliance upon the [dependent nature], another* imagination arises just as it is magically created by a magically created being, therefore it is said: 'In reliance upon the dependent [nature], people's imaginations arise (LAS X k. 150cd).' Due to this, the extreme of denial (*apavāda*) is excluded. This is because one cannot deny the conventional arising." [* BNG 22b5(308,5): *rtog pa gzhan dang gzhan* "various imaginations."]

³⁴ See MĀ D156b2-3: *chos mams thams cad med pa'i phyir // (D //: P om.) zhes bya ba 'dis kyang dngos po mams kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid du brjod de / de dag ji ltar mthong bzhin min // (D //: P /) zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro // tha snyad kyi bden pa la brten nas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / mam par byang ba mam par gzhas (D gzhas: P bzhas) pa ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las bstan pa'i phyir te /... //.* "The [stanza] because all dharmas are nonexistent' (LAS X k. 137a: *abhāvāt sarvadharmānām*) also says that entities are just existent conventionally. This is because it is said: 'those [dharmas] are not existent just as they are seen (X k. 137c: *na ca te tathā yathādr̥ṣṭāḥ*).' This is [also] because the establishments of defilement and purification in reliance upon the conventional truth are explained in the *Prajñāpāramitā*." See also MĀ D161a6-7: *de bas na yang dag par na gnyi ga yang stong pa yin la / yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu na (D na: P ni) gnyi ga yang gnas pa'i phyir kun nas nyon*

c. *Paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*

The thoroughly established nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) means that from their own natures (*rang bzhin gyis*), all dharmas do always not ultimately have any intrinsic natures. That is, the thoroughly established nature should be understood as meaning that both dependent nature and imagined nature are ultimately unestablished. This is because the absence of ultimate intrinsic nature of all dharmas is established due to dharmas' being without any imagined or superimposed ultimate natures and due to their dependent nature which lacks the superimposed nature of ultimate arising and is ultimately unestablished.³⁵

The thoroughly established nature is the ultimate (*paramārtha*), because it has the nature of being established by means of valid cognition. The ultimate also consists in the absence of intrinsic nature, because it is characterized (*prabhāvita*) by the absence of intrinsic nature. Therefore, the thoroughly established nature is ultimately without intrinsic nature and is regarded as the absence of nature concerning the ultimate.³⁶

According to Kamalaśīla, when one understands the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* according to its intentional unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* and the *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*, then that teaching can be understood as explaining the exclusion of the extreme of superimposition (*samāropa/āropa*). This is because all dependent dharmas as they are imagined do not ultimately arise and have no superimposed ultimate natures.³⁷

When the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* is the meaning intended by the teaching of the

mongs pa dang (D dang: P dang /) nam par byang ba'i phyogs med pa'i nyes pa yang ma yin te /. “Therefore, both [defilement and purification] are really void, but on the level of the correct convention, both are existent. Therefore, we do also not have the fault that the divisions of defilement and purification are nonexistent” And see MĀ D152a3-4.

³⁵ See fn. 36.

³⁶ MĀ D151a1-2: *chos thams cad don dam par rtag tu rang bzhin gyis ngo bo nyid med pa kho nar gnas pa gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin te / de ni rtag tu sgro btags pa med pa nyid du grub pa'i phyir ro // de yang tshad mas yang dag par grub pa'i bdag nyid kyis don dam pa zhes kyang bya la ngo bo nyid med pas rab tu phyé ba'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin no // de'i phyir 'di ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa yin no //*. “The thoroughly established nature is established as following: from their own natures, all dharmas do always not ultimately have any intrinsic nature at all. This is because the [thoroughly established nature] is always established just as being without superimposed [ultimate natures]. The [thoroughly established nature] is also termed ‘the ultimate’ because it has the nature of being established by means of valid cognition: [the ultimate] is characterized by the absence of intrinsic nature, and therefore [the ultimate] also consists in the absence of intrinsic nature. Therefore, this [thoroughly established nature] is ultimately without intrinsic nature.”

A parallel passage is found in the MMA D1386-7, P167b1-2: *gang yang chos thams cad don dam par rtag tu rang bzhin gyis ngo bo nyid med par gnas pa de yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de / (D de /: P de) [rang bzhin med pa] de ni rtag tu sgro btags pa med pa nyid du grub pa'i phyir ro //*. (The word in the square brackets [] is a comment (*mchan*) inserted in the P edition.)

³⁷ MĀ D153a6-7: *don dam par gzhan gyi dbang ji ltar brtags pa bzhin ma skyes pa'i phyir brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis ma skyes pa nyid do // 'dis ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha' bsal ba yin no //*. “The dependent [dharmas] as they are imagined do not ultimately arise, and therefore no [dharmas] arise at all as having the imagined nature. Due to this, the extreme of superimposition is excluded.” [* The words “no [dharmas] arise at all as having the imagined nature” refer to the LAS X k. 150 ab: *parikalpitaṃ svabhāvena sarvadharmā ajānakāḥ //*]

niḥsvabhāvatā, then due to this intended meaning, the Mādhyamikas accept the absence of intrinsic nature as being the ultimate, and therefore the intended *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* can also be that teaching's definitive meaning (*nītārtha*). Therefore, that teaching is regarded as explaining the intentional and definitive meaning which expresses the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*. He says:

Thus, it is said in the *Samdhinirmocana*:

The [thoroughly established nature] is the ultimate and is also characterized by the absence of intrinsic nature of dharmas, and therefore it is said that [the thoroughly established nature] is without nature concerning the ultimate.

From the point of view of this absence of nature, all dharmas are just without intrinsic nature. Therefore, the teaching of nonarising and so forth expresses the definitive meaning (*nītārtha*). Because the [nonarising and so forth] are taught with the intention of the ultimate, those are also not contradictory with the empirical [objects] (*dr̥ṣṭa-virodha*) and are also not literally understood. Therefore, it is not contradictory that a teaching with an intentional meaning also expresses the definitive meaning.³⁸

Thus, Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the three kinds of no-natures makes it possible for him to hold that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* is a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning and to invalidate the Yogācāra idea that it would be a teaching to be understood according to an interpretative meaning. Moreover, that interpretation of Kamalaśīla also enables him to reply to the several objections that the Yogācāras raised. That is, his interpretation serves as the reason for saying that the Mādhyamikas will not have the twenty-eight wrong views explained in the *Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanasūtra*, because his interpretation shows that the Mādhyamikas understand the *niḥsvabhāvatā* not according to the literal meaning but according to an unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures. His interpretation also shows the middle way free of the two extremes of superimposition and denial and allows him to say that the Mādhyamikas accept the establishment of both defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and

³⁸ MĀ D151b2-4: *de skad du 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa las / de ni don dam pa yang yin la / chos mams ngo bo nyid med pas rab tu phye ba yang yin pas de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bya'o zhes gsungs te / gang gi phyir ngo bo nyid med pa 'dis chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin pas de'i phyir sbye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa nges pa'i don yin no // de ni don dam pa la dgongs nas bstan pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba yang ma yin la / sgra ji bzhin du yongs su rtog pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //*

SNS p. 68, 30-32: *de ni don dam pa yin la / don dam pa ni chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis rab tu phye ba yin pas de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid zhes bya'o /*

purification (*vyavadāna*), because they accept the establishment of the undeniable correct conventional natures of dharmas.

5. Conclusion

Thus, Kamalaśīla, on the one hand, invalidates the Yogācāra idea that one should understand the teaching of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* according to an interpretative meaning, and, on the other hand, accepts the Yogācāra idea that the Illustrious One teaches the *niḥsvabhāvatā* with the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures. Therefore, Kamalaśīla does not completely reject the Yogācāra ideas. Rather, showing that the Yogācāra idea that the Illustrious One teaches the *niḥsvabhāvatā* with the intention of three kinds of no-natures is compatible with the Mādhyamika idea that the *niḥsvabhāvatā* is a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning, he seems to undertake a reconciliation of the doctrinal conflict between the two schools and harmonize the Yogācāra philosophy with that of the Mādhyamika. Kamalaśīla established this doctrinal compatibility or harmony by means of his interpretations of the *nitārtha*, *neyārtha*, three natures and three kinds of no-natures.

All these interpretations of Kamalaśīla are based upon Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition and Kamalaśīla's *vastubalapravṛttānumānas*. In order to justify his interpretations of three kinds of no-natures and three natures, Kamalaśīla quotes many scriptures and treatises, such as Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XV-1, 2ab, 8 and XXI-17ab. Kamalaśīla accepts and quotes them as the statements which are not refuted by valid cognition, viz., Kamalaśīla's *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* which state five reasons, such as dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Since Kamalaśīla's *vastubalapravṛttānumānas* are also established on the basis of Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition, it seems possible to say that that theory of Dharmakīrti serves as the grounds for establishing all those interpretations of Kamalaśīla.

Kamalaśīla's accepting that theory of Dharmakīrti as his philosophical grounds makes it possible for him to solve the doctrinal conflict between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra.

Abbreviations and Literature

- AK *Abhidharmakośakārikā* of Vasubandhu: P. Pradhan. *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu. See AK.
- AS *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga: 瑜伽行思想研究会. 梵藏漢对校,

- E-text, *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. Volume I, II, III, Shiga (<http://www.shiga-med.ac.jp/public/yugagyō/>), 2003.
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- P5287.
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- PrasP *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti: L. de La Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakārikās (Madhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna: Avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. St. Petersburg: Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, 1903-1913. Reprinted Osnabrück, 1970.
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- SDVK *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* of Jñānagarbha. D3881.
- SDVP *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita. D3883, P5283.
- SDVV *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* of Jñānagarbha. D3882.
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- TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. See TS.
- VY *Vyākhyāyukti* of Vasubandhu, D4061.

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